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Abstract
A time-series cross-sectional analysis of the IMF’s macroeconomic forecasts during 1994-
2003 suggests that forecast performance differed across regions: optimism in Africa and Latin 
America, pessimism in industrial countries and the Middle East, and lack of systematic bias 
in emerging Asia and transition countries. Further analysis shows that the optimistic bias was 
related to the presence of an IMF lending program in Africa and errors in forecasting US interest 
rates in Latin America. Unanticipated changes in the monetary policy of the largest economy and 
oil prices had statistically signifi cant impact not only on the forecasts for Latin America, but also 
for other regions, though in different directions.
JEL classifi cation codes: E37, F37, F53
Keywords: IMF forecasts, forecasting bias, macroeconomic forecasts
I.  Introduction
This paper examines the characteristics of the macroeconomic forecasts produced by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In particular, it tests the unbiasedness and effi ciency of IMF macroeconomic 
forecasts for six regions and to see whether a bias, if any, was systematically related to the presence 
of an IMF program or forecast errors on key global variables, such as US interest rates. The paper 
attempts to add to the literature by identifying the sources of bias in IMF forecasts; it applies several 
alternative methodologies, with appropriate robustness checks. The data used for the study come from 
the 1994-2003 period, when the IMF maintained a relatively large number of lending arrangements 
with member countries at different income levels.1
* The authors have benefi ted from the useful comments of Professor Michael Artis and Dr. Philip Hubbard. However, 
we remain solely responsible for the views expressed in the paper as well as for any remaining errors.
† Professor of Economics, Osaka University
‡ Management Consultant, Booz & Company
1 Against the plentiful supply of international capital inflows into emerging markets, and possibly with the stigma 
of IMF fi nancing, the number of new non-concessional lending arrangements declined drastically from 12 in 2003 
(end-April) to 5 in 2004 (and further to 2 in 2007). It was not until the fall of 2008, following the onset of the global 
fi nancial crisis, that the number of non-concessional arrangements picked up again.
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The IMF’s macroeconomic forecasts are unique in that they are produced by an international 
financial institution with near-universal membership. This means that they reflect both the IMF’s 
knowledge of individual economies (which it monitors on a regular basis) and its understanding of the 
interlinkages between them, which may constrain the behavior of economic variables in individual 
countries. The IMF’s knowledge of economic developments and prospects in individual countries may 
not be as intimate as that of national authorities or local forecasters, but it has the distinct advantage 
of understanding how they may interact with each other across borders. Because the forecasts for all 
countries are produced simultaneously, moreover, we expect them to satisfy the general equilibrium 
constraints that are binding for the world economy, at least to a greater extent than the comparable 
forecasts produced by other institutions. As such, IMF macroeconomic forecasts receive considerable 
attention when they are released and may even serve as a benchmark for other forecasters in some 
cases.2
It therefore comes as no surprise that the accuracy of IMF macroeconomic forecasts has been much 
discussed in the literature. For example, a number of previous studies, including Barrionuevo (1993) 
and Artis (1997), noted that the IMF’s current-year growth and infl ation forecasts for G7 countries 
were optimistic in the 1970s but the forecasts became pessimistic in the 1980s. For the 1990s, 
Timmermann (2006) found that the direction of bias was different across the G7 countries but the bias 
was statistically insignifi cant; Blix et al (2001) showed that the forecast for industrial countries were 
pessimistic, though the bias was numerically small.3
As to the IMF’s forecasts for developing countries, most previous studies have almost always found 
them to be optimistically biased. Artis (1997) and GAO (2003) attributed this to the presence of an 
IMF lending program, but the robustness of this result has been disputed (see Musso and Phillips, 
2002; Ghosh et al., 2005; Timmermann, 2006). Previous studies have generally attempted to identify 
the source of bias by making a distinction between countries with IMF programs and those without, 
but the presence of an IMF program may be proxying for the infl uence of other factors that necessitate 
fi nancial assistance from the IMF.
In identifying the source of bias in the macroeconomic forecasts for IMF program countries, this 
paper employs a more discriminating approach by making a distinction not only between program 
and nonprogram countries but also between program and nonprogram years. In addition, the paper 
also seeks to analyze the impact of errors in forecasting global variables on the accuracy of IMF 
macroeconomic forecasts for individual countries, an approach similar to the one used by Artis (1988) 
for G7 countries. By controlling for the IMF’s errors in forecasting oil prices and the exchange rate 
and interest rates of the largest economy, we attempt to measure the extent to which the forecast errors 
on global variables explain the errors in the IMF’s macroeconomic forecasts for a larger group of 
countries.
2 According to data supplied to the authors by the IMF’s External Relations Department, during 2005, there were about 
3500 press references world-wide to the semiannual World Economic Outlook report. It is believed that many of these 
references were related to the macroeconomic forecasts released therein.
3 Blix et al (2001) also show that pessimism for industrial countries was a characteristic of Consensus forecasts as well.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the data and methodology 
used in this study. Section III presents the empirical results on the unbiasedness and effi ciency of IMF 
forecasts. Section IV attempts to identify the sources of forecast errors. Section V presents concluding 
remarks. Finally, Appendix I lists the sample countries, grouped by region or country group, and 
Appendix II presents a series of tables reporting the corresponding results from bootstrapped data.
 
II.  Data and Methodology
In this study, we restrict our attention to the IMF’s real GDP growth and inflation forecasts for 
1994?2003, a period when the IMF maintained a relatively large number of lending arrangements with 
member countries at different income levels. We use the April issues of the World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) for the IMF’s current?year forecasts, and the September issues for its one year?ahead forecasts. 
We use the April 2004 issue to obtain the realized time-series of growth and infl ation for IMF member 
countries for the relevant past years, and likewise the September 2004 issue for the realized time-
series of the global variables.4 In order to eliminate outliers and secure a more balanced dataset, we 
select a sample of 109 countries with an annual GDP of $5 billion or more (see Appendix I). Given 
our focus on the IMF’s overall forecast performance, we present our results by region or country 
group, though we also look at individual countries to make additional inferences.5
The regression analysis consists of estimating the following two models:6
Test of unbiasedness: itititit eRF ?? +==− 0 , with 0: 00 =?H  (1)
Test of effi ciency: ititit FR ??? ++= 10  , with 0: 00 =?H  and 11 =?  (2)
where F is a forecast value, R is a realized value, e is a forecast error, β0 and β1 are coeffi cients to be 
estimated, μ  is a random error term, i is a country subscript, and t is a time subscript.
In order to assess the possible roles of an IMF lending program and forecast errors on the global 
variables in generating systematic forecast errors, we also estimate the following relationships:
itititititit NonfuelPetroleumUSINTUSEXRe ?????? +++++= 4321 , (3)
itiiiit NonPRGFPRGFNonprograme ???? +++= 321 , (4)
4 Some studies have used the realized numbers obtained from the next available publication for each year. Our 
preliminary analysis suggests that this choice of realized numbers does not materially change the results of the paper.
5 The regions and country groups are as defi ned by the WEO, except for transition countries (for which Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States are combined).
6 These tests are widely used in the literature and discussed by Barrionuevo (1993), Artis (1997), and Gavin and Mandal 
(2003).
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itititit nonprogramprograme ??? ++= 21 , (5) 
where program and nonprogram (or Nonprogram) are dummy variables for the presence and absence 
of any IMF lending program,7 PRGF is a dummy variable for a Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) program, the IMF’s concessional lending window for low-income countries,8 and 
NonPRGF is a dummy variable for the IMF’s other lending instruments; USEXR and USINT are 
forecast errors on the real effective appreciation of the US dollar and the real rate of return on US 
dollar deposits, respectively; Petroleum and Nonfuel are forecast errors on the changes in oil and 
commodity prices;9 and β k (k=1, 4) is a coeffi cient to be estimated. The forecast errors for the global 
variables are expressed as percentage changes, except for the forecast error for the real interest rate 
(which is assumed to be stationary).10
The main problem in applying regression analysis to IMF forecasts comes from the short sample 
period. To address this problem, we employ time-series cross-sectional regression and check the 
robustness of the results by bootstrapping the sample 1000 times. In addition, we use three alternative 
panel-data methods, namely, OLS Prais-Winsten, panel-data GLS, and Generalized Estimating 
Equations (GEE), all of which are considered to produce more reliable estimates when the sample has 
a fi xed T and a limited number of countries. The results of all three methods, both from the original 
and bootstrapped data, are found to yield broadly the same conclusions. The results obtained from the 
bootstrapped data are reported in Appendix II.
Another potential problem concerns parameter restrictions, because earlier studies of IMF forecasts 
have suggested the possibility that parameter values may systematically differ across countries. 
Because we are more interested in the overall performance of IMF forecasts, rather than their 
performance in individual countries, a GLS panel-data estimator may be more appropriate for our 
purpose. The GLS panel-data estimator yields a weighted average of the within-group and between-
group estimators, by increasing the number of observations and adjusting the forecast errors by 
standard deviations (which can be thought of as a proxy for forecasting diffi culty).
7 It should be noted that the dummies in equation (4) are country-specifi c, while those in equation (5) are both country 
and time-specifi c. For a country that has never had an IMF program, the value of the Nonprogram dummy in equation (4) 
is set equal to 1 for all years, but it turns out that the sample used for testing equation (5) contains no such country. In 
this sense, the nonprogram dummies in these two equations are not exactly the same thing. It is for this reason that the 
notation for the nonprogram dummy is capitalized in equation (4) but not in equation (5).
8 In 2010, the PRGF was replaced by a new concessional lending facility with more fl exible terms called the Extended 
Credit Facility (ECF).
9 As given by the IMF’s index of commodity prices.
10 The stationarity of forecast errors for the real interest rate could be tested formally by a panel cointegration test, which 
normally requires a minimum of 20 observations to yield robust results. Unfortunately, our sample is limited to 10 
observations per country.
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III.  Tests of Unbiasedness and Effi ciency
Figures 1 and 2 depict, for the period 1991-2003, the time-series of economic growth and infl ation, 
respectively, for six regions or country groups (industrial countries, emerging Asia, Latin America, 
transition countries, the Middle East, and Africa), along with the IMF’s current-year forecast errors for 
each of these variables. At fi rst glance, we observe that the magnitude of the forecast errors generally 
declined over time,11 as the global economic environment became more stable. This is particularly 
the case for the infl ation forecasts: the forecast errors declined sharply in Latin America, transition 
countries, the Middle East and Africa, along with an evident secular decline in the rate of infl ation 
from the first half of the 1990s. Another observable pattern is a seemingly negative correlation 
between the realized values and the forecast errors. This was particularly evident in emerging Asia and 
transition countries, for both growth and infl ation. In part, the negative correlation may be a statistical 
artifact that refl ects the defi nition of a forecast error, but it could also refl ect the cyclical factor related 
to a consistent failure to forecast the turning points accurately.
These figures seem to indicate that the forecasts were systematically different for different 
regions or country groups. For example, the growth forecasts for industrial countries may have been 
pessimistic as the forecast errors are found mostly in the negative range, whereas the forecasts for 
Africa were clearly optimistic in that the forecast errors were consistently positive throughout the 
period. A similar tendency is observed for Latin America, where the forecast errors were mostly in the 
positive range. For infl ation, the forecasts for Latin America and transition countries were optimistic 
in the early 1990s and the mid-1990s, respectively, when the realized values consistently exceeded the 
forecast values (with the forecast errors consistently in the negative range). The pattern for emerging 
Asia was somewhat different, displaying no consistent bias of one type or the other: the forecast errors 
for both growth and infl ation took both negative and positive values.
Formal statistical tests confi rm these casual observations (Table 1). First, for industrial countries, 
the coeffi cient (β0) for current-year forecast errors estimated from running equation (1) is negative and 
statistically signifi cant for growth12 and positive and statistically signifi cant for infl ation, indicating 
that the forecasts were pessimistic. The forecast errors for infl ation, however, were numerically very 
small. Second, for Africa, the estimated coeffi cient was positive and statistically signifi cant for growth 
and negative and generally signifi cant for infl ation, indicating that the forecasts were optimistic. To 
the extent that many African economies depend on commodity exports, forecasting growth can be a 
particularly diffi cult exercise. But the optimistic bias in growth forecasts was signifi cant in the GLS 
estimation, even after adjusting for the variance of the forecast errors (as a proxy for forecasting 
diffi culty).13
11 When we look at the forecast errors for individual countries, we fi nd that they were often large, even for industrial 
countries. For example, the forecast errors for growth in the United States ranged between -1.93 percent and 0.93 
percent.
12 There was a considerable variation across countries. For example, the underprediction of growth was particularly 
noticeable for the United States and the United Kingdom, whereas growth was overpredicted for Germany and Italy.
13 When the data for individual countries are considered, the forecasts for a handful of African countries were on the 
pessimistic side, possibly refl ecting political instability in these countries.
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The other regions were between these two polar cases. The forecasts for emerging Asia and 
transition economies did not have a consistent bias; the forecasts for Latin America were optimistic 
for growth, but not for infl ation; the forecasts for the Middle East were pessimistic for growth, but not 
for infl ation. These results, based on the original data, do not materially change when the bootstrapped 
data are used (see Appendix II, Table A1). The time series of the forecast errors, as presented in 
Figures 1 and 2, suggest that the largely unbiased nature of forecasts for emerging Asia may refl ect 
the canceling out of overprediction in some years and underprediction in others for infl ation and (as 
an inspection of the data for individual countries would show) overprediction in some countries and 
underprediction in others for growth. Likewise, the growth forecasts for transition countries were 
unbiased, possibly because of the time-series averaging of positive errors in the early 1990s and 
negative ones in the later years.
??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
A. Growth
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
Industrial Constant (β0) -0.41 -0.36 -0.45 -0.41
(0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10)
Emerging Asia Constant (β0) 0.02 0.00 0.22 -0.02
(0.23) (0.17) (0.27) (0.26)
Latin America Constant (β0) 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.38
(0.19) (0.13) (0.21) (0.15)
Transition Constant (β0) 0.05 -0.24 -0.03 0.17
(0.34) (0.26) (0.40) (0.36)
Middle East Constant (β0) -0.67 -0.75 -0.89 -0.67
(0.30) (0.19) (0.31) (0.28)
Africa Constant (β0) 0.66 0.65 0.82 0.65
(0.19) (0.14) (0.24) (0.24)
B. Infl ation
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
Industrial Constant (β0) 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.17
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06)
Emerging Asia Constant (β0) -1.07 -0.74 -1.26 -1.08
(0.59) (0.28) (0.55) (0.91)
Latin America Constant (β0) 0.54 -0.05 -3.23 -0.06
(0.74) (0.20) (2.12) (1.17)
Transition Constant (β0) -8.91 -3.18 -25.60 -8.66
(6.60) (3.07) (20.01) (5.68)
Middle East Constant (β0) 0.80 0.59 0.96 0.70
(0.63) (0.21) (0.72) (1.06)
Africa Constant (β0) -2.11 -0.59 -3.46 -2.13
(0.71) (0.52) (1.14) (0.97)
Notes: 1 Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 2 OLS estimation with robust standard errors.
 3 GLS and OLS P-W (Prais-Winsten) estimations with heteroskedastic and serially correlated (panel-specific) 
errors.
 4 Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) estimation with AR(1) within-group serial correlation and semi-robust 
standard errors.
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Table 2 replicates the results reported in Table 1 for one year-ahead forecasts (see Appendix?, 
Table A2 for the results based on the bootstrapped data). It turns out that the IMF growth forecasts 
become more optimistic when the forecast horizon is lengthened. Specifi cally, the estimated coeffi cient 
(β0) shifts upward for all regions and country groups regardless of the estimation method used, with 
the result that growth optimism for Latin America and Africa is greater while growth pessimism for 
industrial countries and the Middle East disappears (the forecasts for emerging Asia and transition 
economies remain unbiased). For infl ation forecasts, however, there was no consistent change in the 
degree of biasedness across the regions. For industrial countries, emerging Asia, and the Middle East, 
the IMF forecasts become more pessimistic when the forecast horizon is lengthened, as indicated by 
the fact that the estimated coeffi cient shifts upward for all estimation methods. On the other hand, the 
forecasts become more optimistic for infl ation in Africa. For Latin America and transition countries, 
??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
A. Growth
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
Industrial Constant (β0) -0.14 -0.25 -0.17 -0.14
(0.14) (0.09) (0.18) (0.13)
Emerging Asia Constant (β0) 0.25 0.13 0.55 0.21
(0.33) (0.26) (0.42) (0.34)
Latin America Constant (β0) 1.18 1.13 1.38 1.15
(0.24) (0.19) (0.30) (0.21)
Transition Constant (β0) 0.82 0.44 0.85 1.12
(0.49) (0.37) (0.53) (0.40)
Middle East Constant (β0) -0.43 -0.43 -0.62 -0.43
(0.34) (0.25) (0.43) (0.35)
Africa Constant (β0) 1.14 0.93 1.20 1.12
(0.24) (0.15) (0.26) (0.35)
B. Infl ation
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
Industrial Constant (β0) 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07)
Emerging Asia Constant (β0) -0.93 -0.39 -0.67 -0.88
(0.98) (0.43) (1.44) (1.54)
Latin America Constant (β0) -0.21 0.10 -0.31 -0.39
(0.88) (0.25) (1.02) (1.23)
Transition Constant (β0) -21.00 -15.15 -41.98 -21.13
(11.11) (5.02) (19.66) (10.54)
Middle East Constant (β0) 1.73 1.43 1.70 1.67
(0.74) (0.27) (0.72) (1.37)
Africa Constant (β0) -4.70 -2.99 -7.69 -4.78
(1.16) (0.99) (2.28) (1.41)
Notes: 1 Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 2 OLS estimation with robust standard errors.
 3 GLS and OLS P-W (Prais-Winsten) estimations with heteroskedastic and serially correlated (panel-specific) 
errors.
 4 Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) estimation with AR(1) within-group serial correlation and semi-robust 
standard errors.
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the direction of bias changes depending on the estimation method used. It is generally the case that the 
year-ahead infl ation forecasts were unbiased for Latin America but biased for transition economies.
The results of testing the efficiency (or the joint hypothesis of unbiasedness and no serial 
correlation) of IMF forecasts are reported in Table 3 (the results based on the bootstrapped data are 
reported in Appendix II, Table A3). It is generally the case that the IMF forecasts were effi cient for 
regions where they were found to be unbiased. Both the growth and infl ation forecasts were effi cient 
for emerging Asia, while this was also the case for the growth forecasts for transition economies and 
the infl ation forecasts for Africa. The ineffi ciency of infl ation forecasts for transition economies may 
be mainly caused by serial correlation, rather than bias (see Timmermann, 2006). On the other hand, 
although these results are generally robust to bootstrapping, the ineffi ciency of infl ation forecasts for 
Latin America disappears in the bootstrapped data.
The results of Table 3 are replicated in Table 4 for one year-ahead forecasts. When the forecast 
horizon is lengthened, the forecasts become more inefficient, except for transition countries. The 
test of unbiasedness indicates that the growth forecast errors for all regions shift up, offsetting the 
pessimism in industrial countries and the Middle East, and strengthening the optimism in Africa 
and Latin America. The test of efficiency for the year-ahead forecasts shows that the joint test of 
unbiasedness and no serial correlation cannot be rejected for industrial countries, the Middle East, 
and emerging Asia. To the extent that the constant term is positive and for the most part statistically 
signifi cant, the growth forecasts for these regions can also be said to have had a pessimistic bias. Our 
results are again robust to bootstrapping (see Appendix II, Table A4).
IV.  Sources of Forecast Errors
Some may consider our fi nding of systematic bias in the IMF’s growth and infl ation forecasts for 
certain regions as evidence against the rationality of IMF forecasts. Within the specifi c context of IMF 
forecasts, however, the nature of the forecasting exercise (in which key global assumptions are made 
at the outset of each forecasting round) may also be a source of bias (or errors more generally). For 
example, forecast errors may be caused by either overpredicting or underpredicting certain key global 
variables upon which the growth and infl ation forecasts for individual countries are based.
Alternatively, one can also consider such bias as reflecting specific incentives or wishful 
expectations on the part of the IMF (for such views in different contexts, see Ito, 1990; Laster et al., 
1999). In the past, for example, such optimistic bias for developing countries was attributed to the 
nature of the IMF’s program engagement with these countries. The typically larger forecast errors for 
developing countries may refl ect the greater forecasting diffi culty inherent in their characteristically 
more volatile economic environments.
In what follows, we attempt to identify the sources of optimistic bias in certain developing regions. 
Because our finding of optimistic bias in these regions was independent of volatility, we do not 
consider volatility as a cause of systematic errors. Instead, we focus our attention here on (i) errors 
in forecasting the real effective exchange rate of the US dollar, the real rate of return on US dollar 
deposits, oil prices, and commodity prices; and (ii) the presence of an IMF lending program.
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Forecast errors on global variables
Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (3) for the IMF’s current-year forecast errors. 
The errors in forecasting the key global variables seemed to have greater impact on the IMF’s 
growth forecasts for individual countries when the region concerned is more closely integrated with 
international capital markets, such as Latin America. The lower than expected interest rates in the 
United States and, to a much less (albeit statistically significant) extent, the forecast errors on oil 
prices accounted for a signifi cant portion of the optimism observed in Latin America. This is not the 
case for the other regions.
Different patterns are observable for different regions or country groups. First, the forecast errors on 
oil prices had a negative impact on the Middle East and Latin America, where a number of countries 
are net oil exporters; the forecast errors for oil prices had a positive impact on industrial countries and 
emerging Asia, where the countries are by and large net oil importers.14 The positive coeffi cient for 
the oil price forecast error means that an underprediction of oil prices (which was almost consistently 
observed during the sample period) increases (decreases) the extent to which growth is underpredicted 
(overpredicted) in industrial countries and emerging Asia. On the one hand, this might seem 
contradictory because higher than expected oil prices could lead to an economic slowdown through 
their impact on input prices. On the other hand, negative forecast errors on oil prices may be capturing 
a positive shock to global economic activity that is diffi cult to identify precisely. The differences in the 
impact of forecast errors on oil prices could also to some extent be an outcome of spurious correlation. 
Whatever the reason may be, the signifi cant correlation between the assumption errors (except for 
the errors on the real effective exchange rate for large economies) and the macroeconomic forecast 
errors may mean that more accurate global assumptions could improve the IMF’s forecasts, at least for 
Latin America. On the other hand, such improvement would have the least impact in Africa, where the 
global factors do not play a signifi cant role in explaining the accuracy of forecasts.
In contrast to these results for the current?year forecasts, the global factors do not seem to have 
accounted for a signifi cant portion of the one year-ahead forecast errors for Latin America (Table 6). 
The global factors, however, do seem to have played a more important role in generating forecasts for 
emerging Asia and transition economies (note that the forecast errors for the US dollar exchange rate 
were signifi cant only in emerging Asia). In line with the earlier fi nding that the optimistic tendency 
is strengthened when the forecast horizon is lengthened, the constant term becomes statistically 
insignifi cant for industrial countries, and the Middle East (where pessimistic tendency was observed 
for current year forecasts). For transition economies, the forecasts are no longer unbiased when the 
global factors are considered: there was a systematic tendency to overpredict growth.
14 The results for industrial countries must be treated with care because of a possible endogeneity problem. It is possible 
that the forecast errors on oil prices refl ect the forecast errors on world economic growth, which is largely determined 
by growth in industrial countries.
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IMF programs
Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (4) for African countries, which suggest that the 
optimistic bias was related to the presence of an IMF lending program. Further breaking down the 
countries into (i) those with an IMF program under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), 
(ii) those with a non-PRGF program, and (iii) those without any IMF program, we fi nd no evidence 
of bias in the IMF’s current-year forecasts for nonprogram countries, while the growth forecasts were 
signifi cantly optimistic in program countries, particularly those with PRGF programs. This result is 
robust to bootstrapping but contrasts with Ghosh et al (2005) and Timmermann (2006), who claimed 
that optimism in Africa was not limited to program countries. The optimism for program countries 
remains for infl ation, but there is no difference between PRGF and non-PRGF programs.
Finally, Table 8 reports the results of estimating equation (5) for all countries with an IMF program 
(for which the IMF had forecasts) during the sample period. In this larger sample (of 61 countries), 
the growth and infl ation forecasts were generally optimistic.15 When we make a distinction between 
program and nonprogram years, the optimistic bias in the growth forecasts was limited to the program 
years. These results may suggest that the bias was related to the presence of an IMF program for 
growth forecasts, or alternatively that IMF programs were generally more contractionary than had 
been predicted. On the other hand, the bias in the infl ation forecasts was hardly signifi cant for either 
set of years, so that the signifi cant bias for infl ation cannot be attributed to an IMF program.
V.  Conclusion
The IMF’s macroeconomic forecasts for the period 1994-2003 displayed different directions and 
degrees of bias for different regions or groups of countries. Most of the empirical results reported in 
this paper, especially those based on the panel-data GLS estimator (which adjusts for variance, hence 
forecasting diffi culty), suggest that the forecasts were pessimistic for industrial countries but were 
optimistic for Africa and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. 
It appears that the optimistic bias in these regions stemed from the presence of an IMF lending 
program (in the case of Africa) and errors in forecasting the key global variables (in the case of Latin 
America). In the former case, the optimistic bias was especially strong for PRGF countries; in the 
latter case, lower than expected US interest rates and higher than expected oil prices seem to have 
accounted for a signifi cant portion of the optimism. These results are robust to alternative estimation 
methods, as well as use of bootstrapping to increase the effective size of the sample.
The forecast errors for emerging Asia and transition countries were also affected by the errors 
in forecasting the global variables, though in different directions. Further research is needed to 
understand fully the cross-country differences in the transmission channels of global factors, which 
must be causing these divergent results. Another extension of this research would be to identify the 
sources of the pessimistic bias for industrial countries and the Middle East.
15 Although more than 90 countries were under an IMF program between 1994 and 2003, the sample here is restricted to 
countries for which forecasts were made.
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A. Growth
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
No program 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.18
(0.26) (0.13) (0.22) (0.34)
PRGF programs 0.83 0.78 1.09 0.83
(0.28) (0.18) (0.41) (0.31)
Other programs 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.81
(0.47) (0.44) (0.49) (0.60)
Bootstrapped sample OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
No program 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.18
(0.25) (0.39) (0.40) (0.37)
PRGF programs 0.83 0.78 1.09 0.83
(0.27) (0.27) (0.49) (0.31)
Others 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.81
(0.48) (0.69) (0.72) (0.62)
B. Infl ation
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
No program -2.55 -0.51 -11.10 -2.60
(1.85) (2.23) (7.40) (2.54)
PRGF programs -2.17 -0.36 -1.99 -2.20
(0.81) (0.63) (0.84) (1.26)
Other programs -1.59 -0.70 -3.84 -1.54
(1.35) (1.00) (2.21) (1.39)
Bootstrapped sample OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
No program -2.55 -0.51 -11.10 -2.60
(1.77) (3.63) (6.01) (2.61)
PRGF programs -2.17 -0.36 -1.99 -2.20
(0.80) (1.35) (1.69) (1.30)
Other programs -1.59 -0.70 -3.84 -1.54
(1.38) (1.73) (2.84) (1.48)
Notes: 1 Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 2 OLS estimation with robust standard errors.
 3 GLS and OLS P-W (Prais-Winsten) estimations with heteroskedastic and serially correlated (panel-specific) 
errors.
 4 Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) estimation with AR(1) within-group serial correlation and semi-robust 
standard errors.
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A. Growth
OLS GLS OLS P-W GEE
Constant 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.26
(0.13) (0.09) (0.15) (0.13)
Program 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.33
(0.17) (0.11) (0.20) (0.16)
No program 0.11 0.13 0.25 0.14
(0.20) (0.12) (0.22) (0.23)
B. Infl ation
OLS GLS OLS P-W GEE
Constant -10.06 -3.93 -33.51 -10.57
(4.54) (1.86) (16.13) (5.08)
Program -7.67 -3.56 -25.36 -7.56
(4.75) (1.86) (15.03) (4.98)
No program -14.33 -4.78 -45.23 -16.00
(9.40) (2.17) (18.01) (10.52)
Note: 1 Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Industrial 
Countries:
Asia: Latin America: Transition 
Economies:
Middle East: Africa:
United States Bangladesh Argentina Albania Bahrain Algeria
Japan China Bahamas Azerbaijan Egypt Botswana
Germany India Bolivia Belarus Iran Cameroon
France Indonesia Brazil Bulgaria Jordan Cote d’Ivoire
United Kingdom Malaysia Chile Croatia2 Kuwait Ethiopia
Canada Myanmar Colombia Czech Republic2 Lebanon Gabon
Italy Nepal Costa Rica Estonia Libya Ghana
Pakistan Dominican 
Republic
Hungary Oman Kenya
Australia Philippines Kazakhstan Qatar Madagascar
Austria Sri Lanka Ecuador Latvia Saudi Arabia Mauritius
Belgium Thailand El Salvador Lithuania Syria Morocco
Cyprus Vietnam Guatemala Poland United Arab?
Emirates
Nigeria
Denmark Honduras Romania Senegal
Finland Jamaica Russia Yemen2 South Africa
Greece Mexico Turkey Sudan
Iceland Panama Turkmenistan Tanzania
Ireland Paraguay Ukraine Tunisia
Israel Peru Uzbekistan Uganda
Korea Trinidad and 
Tobago
Zimbabwe
Luxembourg
Netherlands Uruguay
New Zealand Venezuela
Norway
Portugal
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Notes: 1 According to the defi nition used by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook. Transition countries combine Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
 2 Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Yemen are excluded from the sample when one year-ahead forecasts are 
analyzed because of data limitation.
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A. Growth
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
Industrial Constant (β0) -0.41 -0.36 -0.45 -0.41
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)
Emerging Asia Constant (β0) 0.02 0.00 0.22 -0.02
(0.23) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27)
Latin America Constant (β0) 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.38
(0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.15)
Transition Constant (β0) 0.05 -0.24 -0.03 0.17
(0.35) (0.24) (0.28) (0.38)
Middle East Constant (β0) -0.67 -0.75 -0.89 -0.67
(0.29) (0.15) (0.18) (0.26)
Africa Constant (β0) 0.66 0.65 0.82 0.65
(0.19) (0.26) (0.33) (0.23)
B. Infl ation
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
Industrial Constant (β0) 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.17
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Emerging Asia Constant (β0) -1.07 -0.74 -1.26 -1.08
(0.57) (0.61) (1.25) (0.89)
Latin America Constant (β0) 0.54 -0.05 -0.43 -0.06
(0.75) (0.42) (1.13) (1.02)
Transition Constant (β0) -8.91 -3.18 -25.60 -8.66
(6.68) (3.44) (19.79) (5.48)
Middle East Constant (β0) 0.80 0.59 0.96 0.70
(0.62) (0.56) (1.43) (1.05)
Africa Constant (β0) -2.12 -0.59 -3.46 -2.13
(0.71) (0.88) (1.83) (0.91)
Notes: 1 Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 2 OLS estimation with robust standard errors.
 3 GLS and GLS P-W (Prais-Winsten) estimations with heteroskedastic and serially correlated (panel-specific) 
errors.
 4 Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) estimation with AR(1) within-group serial correlation and semi-robust 
standard errors.
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A. Growth
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
Industrial Constant (β0) -0.14 -0.25 -0.17 -0.14
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Emerging Asia Constant (β0) 0.25 0.13 0.55 0.21
(0.33) (0.38) (0.32) (0.36)
Latin America Constant (β0) 1.18 1.13 1.38 1.15
(0.24) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21)
Transition Constant (β0) 0.82 0.44 0.85 1.12
(0.52) (0.27) (0.26) (0.44)
Middle East Constant (β0) -0.43 -0.43 -0.62 -0.43
(0.34) (0.35) (0.38) (0.32)
Africa Constant (β0) 1.14 0.93 1.20 1.12
(0.24) (0.30) (0.37) (0.33)
B. Infl ation
OLS2 GLS3 OLS P-W3 GEE4
Industrial Constant (β0) 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Emerging Asia Constant (β0) -0.93 -0.39 -0.67 -0.88
(0.99) (1.27) (2.15) (1.37)
Latin America Constant (β0) -0.21 0.10 -0.31 -0.39
(0.87) (0.88) (1.46) (1.21)
Transition Constant (β0) -21.00 -15.15 -41.98 -21.13
(11.23) (6.75) (23.70) (9.84)
Middle East Constant (β0) 1.73 1.43 1.70 1.67
(0.72) (0.74) (1.78) (1.26)
Africa Constant (β0) -4.70 -2.99 -7.69 -4.78
(1.13) (1.57) (2.95) (1.34)
Notes: 1 Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 2 OLS estimation with robust standard errors.
 3 GLS and OLS P-W (Prais-Winsten) estimations with heteroskedastic and serially correlated (panel-specific) 
errors.
 4 Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) estimation with AR(1) within-group serial correlation and semi-robust 
standard errors.
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